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Abstract: A financial case is made for a value proposition that carbon sequestration in Costa 
Rica provides a greater return to landowners than its opportunity costs.  An introduction and 
background consider the topic of market-based mechanisms used for environmental policy and 
regulation.  Policies and programs related to mitigation of climate change provide the context of 
this discussion.  A literature review characterizes ecosystem services (PES) on a reforestation 
payment basis, identifying the high points of PES schemes’ successes and failures as they relate 
to and help inform economic farm forestry in Costa Rica.  Reforest The Tropics, Inc., a non-
profit organization developing economic farm forestry in Costa Rica, is a base case to analyze 
carbon sequestration and commodification as an economically feasible enterprise.  Carbon 
dioxide sequestration will comprise one leg of the financial analysis, capitalizing on biophysical 
quantities of sequestered carbon and different fixed and variable prices of carbon.  Revenues, 
costs, and net present values derived using a range of discount rates represent another side of the 
financial analysis.  In the end, a set of meaningful scenarios for carbon dioxide commodification 
is translated into a suite of core products that can be marketed to potential project-seeking 
farmers and landowners in Costa Rica.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the past five years, the global conversation around climate change has ripened.  That 
is, experts from the scientific community to the political arena have moved beyond posing 
positive questions, does climate change exist? to soliciting normative questions, or what should 
we do about it?  The shift in paradigm to normative questions, or what should or what ought we 
do about climate change, is a prerequisite to taking action on climate change.  The latter is a 
prescription for both climate mitigation and adaptation strategies.  Furthermore, climate 
mitigation strategies are pre-emptive in nature, aiming to reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Adaptation strategies lessen human vulnerability to climate change, and hone risk 
management to curtail the likelihood of damages and consequences caused by climate change.  
One such mitigation solution is carbon sequestration, a cornerstone in this study.  Mitigation and 
adaptation act as a double-pronged approach for climate change policies on national and global 
scales.  Even if the world stopped emitting all sources of greenhouse gases over the next decade, 
damages from climate change would still manifest over the decade and into the future.  
Therefore, a mixed portfolio of strategies that employ both mitigation and adaptation efforts is 
becoming commonplace for climate policymakers across the globe. 
The Kyoto Protocol 
 The watershed moment thus far in global climate policy history is the Kyoto Protocol, the 
first international agreement and treaty developed in tandem with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto, Japan in 2005 (UNFCCC, 2014).  If 
nothing else, the Kyoto Protocol is a symbol for unprecedented environmental diplomacy and 
convergence on the global stage.  The UNFCCC’s framework for international climate change 
cooperation gave rise to the Kyoto Protocol’s adoption in 1997.  The hallmark of the Kyoto 
Protocol is its legally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets (UNFCCC, 2014).  
Although the inception of the Kyoto Protocol occurred on December 11, 1997, it did not go into 
effect until February 16, 2005.  The UNFCCC laid the groundwork for the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 
2014).  Countries signed the Convention in May 1992, however, governments thought the 
Convention would fall short of their climate change goals.  In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was in 
its infancy as an extension of the Convention, specifically targeting developed countries that 
underwent massive industrialization (UN, 2014).   
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 For the Protocol to launch, 55 countries in the Convention, called Parties, had to ratify the 
treaty.  The Convention held these countries accountable for their legally binding greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets during a specified timetable (UN, 2014).  The Protocol categorized 
developed nations as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases because of their post-industrial 
statuses.  The Protocol saw these nations as the strongest heavy-lifters for climate change, 
especially since the treaty deployed mechanisms to help industrialized nations achieve their 
emission reduction targets (UNFCCC, 2014).  Inevitably, the Kyoto Protocol saddled developed 
countries with the most challenging climate change mitigation strategies, which each country had 
to implement through national measures and programs (UN, 2014).  During what is coined the 
‘First Commitment Period,’ the Protocol instituted a binding emission reduction target of five 
percent using 37 countries’ 1990 emission levels as a baseline (UN, 2014).  A second 
commitment period seeks to reduce levels 18 percent below 1990 levels in an 8-year time period 
between 2013 and 2020 (UNFCCC, 2014).   
 Leaders point to the Protocol as a demonstrative and successful international endeavor 
because it acted on global awareness of climate change.  Beyond awareness, it channeled 
international fear and risk of climate change threats to structure a semi-baked model for 
international action on climate change (Victor, 2001).  In many regards, the Protocol was 
plagued with loopholes and vague policy delegations.  For many developed countries, the 
decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was a race against the clock.  For example, the United 
States’ emissions were steadily rising whilst it decided to ratify the Protocol (Victor, 2014).  
Countries exhibited a widening gap between their emission targets and their actual emissions, a 
red flag that governments had overly grandiose ideas about their targets.  However, a widening 
gap also signaled that there were underlying regulatory flaws in setting reduction targets (Victor, 
2001).  Governments were not adequately equipped with the anticipatory know-how to set 
emission reduction levels (Victor, 2001).   
The Protocol grappled with considerations such as how to incorporate developing 
countries into the calculus.  Developing nations are the largest emitters of greenhouse gases 
today, and in two decades, they will outpace developed nations in total greenhouse gas emissions 
(Victor, 2001).  Unfortunately, the Protocol dealt with a classic case of the North versus South 
debate, a politically-charged argument where the industrialized North argues the developing 
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South should curb its greenhouse gas emissions.  The South, conversely, maintains that is has the 
‘right to emit’ because the industrialized North had the same opportunity.  Furthermore, another 
crucial consideration is deforestation.  Today, deforestation accounts for 20 percent of all 
anthropogenic global carbon dioxide emissions (Gullison et al., 2007).  Because deforestation is 
such a large offender of climate change, it introduces the risk of reversing the Kyoto Protocol’s 
original goals.  For example, deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia alone accounted for four-
fifths of the annual reduction of carbon dioxide emissions mandated by Kyoto from 2008 to 2012 
(Stern, 2006).        
Above all, the Protocol’s framework for addressing the costs involved in meeting 
countries’ emission reduction targets was tangential instead of core (Victor, 2001).  Conditional 
upon meeting their Kyoto reduction targets, governments would have to revamp their national 
economies in drastic ways.  Thus, one of the most prompting questions stemming from Kyoto 
was how Parties could meet their emission targets in a cost-effective manner (UNFCCC, 2014).  
Fortunately, the Protocol outlined three means by which it could help countries meet their 
emissions reduction targets: 1) international emissions trading, 2) the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and 3) Joint Implementation (JI) (UNFCCC, 2014).  In essence, these three 
mechanisms were the basic scaffolding for establishing a world carbon market (UNFCCC, 
2014).  These mechanisms also facilitate green investment between countries and help countries 
achieve their reduction targets in economically feasible ways (UNFCCC, 2014).  More 
importantly, critics of the Protocol identify these cost-saving mechanisms as the linchpins for 
viable and timely attainment of countries’ reduction targets and for slowing global climate 
change (Victor, 2001).   
BACKGROUND 
Introduction to Market Mechanisms  
 The Kyoto Protocol was an invaluable policy for spurring further research on market- 
based instruments (MBIs) to address climate change (Victor, 2001).  A MBI, as it applies to both 
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, is an environmental law and policy 
instrument that relies on markets, prices, or other economic variables to deliver incentives to 
emitters that agree to reduce emissions.  MBIs are the umbrella term used to encompass a slew of 
economic tools and sanctions such as taxes, charges, fees, fines, penalties, liability and 
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compensation, subsidies, and tradable permits (UNEP, 2009).  Although the definition of a MBI 
is subject to change based on the environmental context, all MBIs have underlying elements 
(UNEP, 2009).  By convention, when an economic tool or sanction changes the price or cost of a 
good or service in the market, it is a market-based instrument.  Alternatively, an economic tool 
that changes the quantity of a good can also be classified as a market-based economic 
instrument.  MBIs are preferred over explicit directions for pollution control efforts because they 
are put into the polluter’s own terms, and with synergistic effects, they can achieve wide-
reaching policy goals (Stavins, 2003).    
The notion of marginal cost is applicable to every market-based instrument.  In short, 
MBIs spread the additional costs associated with greenhouse gas reduction across firms, which 
firms incur as a marginal cost (Stavins, 2003).  MBIs should, theoretically, render pollution 
reduction at its lowest overall cost to society.  By means of allocating the largest incentives for 
the greatest pollution reduction, MBIs are conducive to firms that can reduce pollution most 
cheaply (Stavins, 2003).   
Categories of Market-Based Instruments             
 There are several categories of market-based instruments, however, for the purpose of 
this study, the focus will be on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto 
Protocol and the UN-borne REDD Program (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation).  The CDM, found in Article 12 of the Protocol, enables a Party with an emissions-
reduction or emissions-limitation commitment, to turn to a developing country to achieve 
emission reductions.  That is, a Party can initiate an emissions-reduction project in a developing 
country as a legitimate avenue to meet target goals (UNFCCC, 2014).  Examples of viable CDM 
projects in developing countries include electrification using solar panels and reforestation 
efforts (UNFCC, 2014).  The United Nations, in particular, has a high number of CDM forestry 
projects (UNFCCC, 2014).  In the case of reforestation, this study examines carbon as a payment 
for ecosystem services, certified emission reduction credits (CERs) and ecosystem services, and 
the intersection between them.  As a product of time and an ecosystem service such as carbon 
sequestration, CDM emission-reduction projects in developing countries generate streams of 
CERs.  Each credit is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide and can apply toward Kyoto reduction 
targets.  CERs compose the largest group of compliance credits on the carbon market and can 
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only be generated through projects in developing countries (Carbon Planet, 2009).  The thorny 
question regarding CERs is the price at which CERs are sold (Jayachandran, 2013).  
Many Kyoto leaders herald the CDM as the world’s first environmental credit scheme, 
particularly pertaining to offsets (UNFCCC, 2014).  The CDM is a purveyor of the added 
flexibility developed nations require to realistically meet their reduction targets (Victor, 2001).  
While robust enough to foster sustainable development and significant emissions reductions, the 
CDM is also the low-hanging fruit.  Developing countries in which CDM projects are 
implemented are exempt from the Protocol (Chadwick, 2006).  Therefore, host countries of the 
CDM have no legally binding commitments to emissions reductions under the Protocol.  As a 
result, there is little incentive for the project-developing country to reduce its emissions 
(Chadwick, 2006).  In response to this concern, there are certain conditions that a CDM project 
must meet with respect to baseline emissions (Chadwick, 2006).  The baseline for emissions, or 
the ‘business as usual’ baseline, is especially important because CERs theoretically represent the 
difference between baseline emissions and overall observed emissions (Chadwick, 2006).  In 
most cases, this difference between baseline emissions and observed emissions cannot represent 
greenhouse gases removed from the atmosphere.  Instead, this difference projects the transfer 
allocation of emissions from the host country to the developed country (Chadwick, 2006).  
 The CDM ignores the poverty contexts in developing countries, a fundamental 
socioeconomic factor that cannot be dismissed.  Opposition to the CDM claims that the 
livelihoods of self-employed and land-owning people in developing countries are disregarded 
during a game of The Race to the Bottom (Jayachandran, 2013).   
 Market-Based Instruments versus Regulation  
It is important to explore the differences between market-based instruments, regulation, 
and their relationship.  Once regulation is a factor through government intervention, firms must 
weigh the option of purchasing carbon offsets against reducing emissions.  The option a firm will 
pursue should be the lowest-cost option because the firm is forced to comply with government 
standards or policies.  Furthermore, market-based instruments are a very promising tool for 
environmental policy makers (Gayer & Horowitz, 2006).  Moreover, economists have 
historically pushed environmental policy makers to harness the power of MBIs for well-argued 
reasons.  Market-based mechanisms help achieve environmental goals in the most cost-effective 
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manner through the power of incentive-based coercion (Gayer & Horowitz, 2006).  Nevertheless, 
the flow of incoming financial benefits should match the marginal cost of outputting an 
additional ton of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (Stern, 2006).  Secondly, MBIs are effective 
at internalizing negative environmental externalities.   
Thus, there is a close overlay between market-based instruments used as tools for 
environmental policy.  For example, a firm that purchases carbon offsets (abatement) can 
consider it an emissions reduction plan.  When a policy requires firms to regulate their carbon 
dioxide, they can buy offsets as a means of policy compliance.  A U.S. firm might turn to a local 
cap-and-trade program, such as California’s notable greenhouse gas program, or the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap and trade program in New England, as a means of 
compliance by purchasing offsets.  Theoretically, prices should be higher on the compliance 
market because demand is high and relatively inelastic.  A voluntary carbon market, on the other 
hand, should exhibit lower prices and more elastic demand since it is the vehicle for do-gooder 
business and individuals to purchases offset credits (Gayer & Horowitz, 2006).   
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD and REDD+) 
 The UN REDD Program was launched in 2008 as an international climate change 
mitigation strategy (Ali et al., 2010).  REDD’s trademark is avoided deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries.  The key is avoided because REDD allows ‘avoided 
deforestation’ value propositions to tap carbon markets.  Furthermore, REDD operates on a 
platform similar to, yet also fundamentally different from, the CDM (Ali et al., 2010).  High-
emitting developed countries pay developing countries to prevent deforestation or degradation of 
land.  Eager to take action, the UN strategically built REDD around the third largest global 
offender of climate change—deforestation and forest degradation activities (Ali et al., 2010).  
The UN’s approach to apply pressure on a significant driver of climate change was, in part, to 
reduce pollution sufficiently and in time to ward off climate change’s foreboding threats (Ali et 
al., 2010).  
 In a REDD contract, countries have a clear economic incentive to avoid future 
deforestation and forest degradation through the mobilization of funds from developed countries.  
REDD+ is slightly differentiated because it gives countries the additional option of practicing 
sustainable forest management (Ali et al., 2010).  REDD+ is the merger between carbon benefits 
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in the form of increased carbon stocks in forests and ancillary benefits, most of which are 
environmental like water and soil conservation.  Unlike the CDM under Kyoto, REDD and 
REDD+ allow for more forestry projects.  Developed countries that fund projects under CDM do 
not have the option to fund avoided deforestation’ projects.  There is a small category under 
CDM for afforestation and reforestation projects, however, they are narrowly defined and small 
in scope (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2014).  Developed countries can purchase offset credits from 
developing countries for avoided deforestation.  Above all, REDD has succeeded because it 
places a financial value on stored carbon in forests (UN-REDD Programme, 2014).  For this 
financial template to work, the commercial benefits of deforestation and natural resource 
extraction cannot exceed the commercial benefits associated with stored carbon in forests 
(Carbon Planet, 2009). 
 The Kyoto Protocol did not incorporate the REDD mechanism with its three emission 
reduction mechanisms because of scant information on deforestation emissions and monitoring 
at the time.  As a result, REDD is not a part of the regulatory market whose carbon prices grew 9 
percent in lockstep with the Kyoto Protocol’s rollout of emission reduction mandates (Gogo, 
2014).  Instead, REDD offset credits are sold on the smaller voluntary market where buyers 
purchase relatively cheap REDD project credits for reasons other than compliance with policies 
or laws (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2014).      
REDD+ and Fair Trade 
 The REDD+ scheme draws several parallels to a Fair Trade system’s basic criteria.  The 
sustainable management component to REDD+ is meant to insinuate other economic, social, and 
environmental benefits that complement a practice.  According to the UN-REDD Programme, 
REDD+ strategies can improve the livelihoods of forest managers and custodians (2014).  
Proponents of REDD+ highlight the opportunity for sustainable development in poverty-stricken, 
countries without needing to rely on time-consuming technology implementations (EDF, 2014).  
They also advocate for REDD+ using but-for causation: but for REDD+, deforestation and 
climate change would gravely devastate indigenous communities who rely on tropical forests for 
their livelihoods.  REDD+ projects lift indigenous communities out of poverty by providing 
them with a fast and new means of increased income.  In addition, they protect biodiversity and 
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the integrity of ecosystem services, and reinvigorate marginalized communities who are the 
figureheads of poverty contexts and tropical forests in developing nations (EDF, 2014).                      
Opposition to REDD and REDD+ 
 Despite their loose ties to the Protocol, REDD and REDD+ mechanisms have received 
modest backlash.  Critics and environmentalists highlight pitfalls of REDD schemes.  REDD+ 
promotes a sense of fair play, much like a Fair Trade scheme, through its delivery of ancillary 
benefits to the environment and local communities.  However, much like the CDM, REDD 
schemes are often transient of and have no appreciation for poverty contexts in which they are 
designed to operate (IPS, 2013).   
Furthermore, there is a cadre of critics that oppose REDD schemes because they produce 
a stream of offsets.  For the developed country, purchasing REDD offset credits from a country 
thousands of miles away is a reduction strategy (IPS, 2013).  So long as the country purchases 
credits from the host country, there is a perverse incentive for the purchasing country to not 
reduce its domestic emissions.  However, purchasing countries view avoided deforestation as an 
authentic reduction strategy (IPS, 2013).  By this logic, countries are not addressing the roots of 
climate change and are instead diverting their attention from important and available 
technologies such as energy efficiency and renewable energy (IPS, 2013).  This represents 
capitalist behavior because countries can legally purchase offsets to mask their continuous 
pollution.  To counter this approach, critics argue that countries should reduce emissions through 
innovative measures, without using offsets as a buy-out (IPS, 2013).  Therefore, some argue that 
offsets should be temporary placeholders until countries can implement effective domestic 
reduction strategies.   
Lastly, critics have doubted the certainty and efficiency of the carbon market.  If the 
carbon market is not capturing the value of standing trees, a scheme like REDD could be a 
rigged and lopsided reward system.  For both developed and developing countries to meet their 
twin goals of curbing deforestation through REDD schemes, the financial system must be 
administratively well-structured, transparent, and highly incentivized based on performance 
(Noordwijk, 2008).  Similarly, REDD credits must be verifiable, measurable, and reportable to 
ensure an adequate level of project governance and oversight.      
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction to Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) Programs  
 Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) represent an overarching classification of 
policies that are designed to do as the name suggests.  That is, PES schemes compensate 
individuals or communities for their pro-environment behaviors and actions that, in turn, ensure 
ecosystem service provisioning into the future (Jack et al., 2008).  The currency of PES policies 
centers on ecosystem services like water purification, flood mitigation, and carbon sequestration 
(Jack et al., 2008).  Payments are awarded conditionally to individuals and communities 
partaking in such behaviors and actions (Jayachandran, 2013).  Furthermore, because PES 
schemes are highly incentivized, there is a greater probability that individuals and communities 
will undergo pro-environment behavior change (Jack et al., 2008). 
 Payments for ecosystem service programs fall under the banner of incentive-based 
mechanisms, one subset of market-based instruments used in environmental policy (Jack et al., 
2008).  PES schemes change the price of environmental protection relative to environmental 
degradation through rendering environmental protection more profitable than environmental 
degradation on the same land.  For this reason, payments for ecosystem services are market-
based instruments (Jack et al., 2008).  As in the case of all environmental policy theories, 
payments for ecosystem services can internalize negative externalities (Pattanayak et al., 2010).  
Economists argue the benefits of ecosystem services are a positive externality of nature itself, 
however, society has not successfully delegated an artificial means by which to internalize these 
positive externalities to the same accord (Pattanayak et al., 2010).  PES policies are gleaned for 
bridging the gap between both extremes in a cost-effective way (Jayachandran, 2013).  The 
contract between the beneficiary (buyer) and provider (seller) of ecosystem services delivers 
payments in the form of subsidies to the providers of ecosystem services.  Since all subsidies 
result in a positive externality, there is a sense of an over-inflated supply of ecosystem services 
(Pattanayak, 2013).  This change in quantity of ecosystem services also constitutes PES policies 
as a MBI.  Unfortunately, successful PES schemes can be hard to come by, especially when the 
economic, political, and social circumstances of developing countries exhibit powerful forces 
over a PES economic theory.   
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Categories of Payments for Ecosystem Services Schemes 
 While there is a registry of PES programs across the world, this study examines PES 
schemes categorically for carbon sequestration.  Subsequently, past literature reviews are cited 
based on the stories they tell about payments for ecosystem services relative to economic farm 
forestry in Costa Rica.  For all categories of PES schemes, it is important to reflect equally on 
land use (i.e. forests and agriculture) and deliverable benefits (i.e. carbon dioxide sequestration, 
economics to farmers, and biodiversity).  
PES Schemes for Carbon Sequestration 
 Countries such as Mexico, Costa Rica, and China have adopted an economic lens through 
which to view forest conservation provisioning in the future (Corbera et al., 2008).  Recently, 
these countries have established national PES schemes whereby governments pay farmers and 
rural communities for future environmental services provisioning (Munoz et al., 2006).  In the 
case of Mexico, carbon sequestration is a perceived form of market-based climate regulation.  
Government actors also operate in the same arena as NGOs and other private incubators that pay 
farmers for reforestation efforts (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).  Governments and companies 
in developed countries are the financial backers of forest conservation and reforestation projects 
throughout the developing world.  Furthermore, the voluntary carbon market has been the 
primary means through which these entities have offset their emissions, while Kyoto’s CDM has 
waned in global project registration (Bayton et al, 2007).     
 In Mexico, carbon payments for reforestation efforts have placed a higher price on 
ecosystem service provisioning than traditional alternative land-uses activities (Corbera et al., 
2008).  However, other important climate strategies such as education and efficient technology 
should be on the political agenda, nonetheless (Engel et al., 2008).  In particular, Mexico has 
been relatively unsuccessful in marketing its sustainable forest management conservation 
initiatives on a national scale, considering it is one of the most deforested places in the world 
(Corbera et al, 2008).  Researchers attribute Mexico’s widespread deforestation to conversions of 
forests to pastured lands suitable for agricultural purposes, especially when conservationist will 
is minimal or lacking.  In response, the Mexican government adopted the PES financial 
institution to stimulate pro-environment behaviors such as forest conservation and reforestation 
in rural communities (Klooster, 1999).  In 2004, the Mexican government implemented a 
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programme for Payments for Carbon after it had launched one of the first carbon forestry 
programs in the world (Corbera, 2005).  Over the years, Payments for Carbon evolved to ensure 
long-term beneficiary commitment to projects and to meet international standards and 
management costs.  In that context, organizations posited that new markets would eventually pair 
up PES service buyers and providers (Corbera et al., 2008).  Additionally, the programme drafted 
specific rules for project design as a guiding mechanism for successful project implementation 
and a hedge against compromised future project performance (Corbera et al., 2008).  Eventually, 
carbon rules aligned with those for small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects under the 
CDM.  As a result, projects were implemented on a large-scale basis (typically 500-3000 hectare 
plantings) and produced voluntary and CDM offsets (Bayon et al., 2007). 
 Above all, rural communities have elicited positive responses to payments for carbon 
services in the past few years.  In fact, carbon payments contribute significantly to average 
household and community income.  PES carbon schemes that incentivize reforestation should 
create an equal and annual level of value proposition to affect behavior change (White and 
Martin, 2002).  Furthermore, the carbon program is a gateway to future forest provisioning, 
which in turn, will generate future benefits for those that are faithful caretakers (Corbera et al., 
2008).  Moreover, the organizational structure for project funding is divided between an 
intermediary (71%) who provides technical assistance and a third-party project certifier (29%) 
(Corbera et al. 2008).  Interviewed individuals advocated for higher carbon payments and 
proposed financial support after the project’s five-year launch period (Corbera et al., 2008).  
Under this condition, farmers are more likely to opt out of their current land use practice for a 
carbon project.  By observation, long-term partnerships between service providers and 
intermediaries bolster participation in carbon projects (White and Martin, 2002).  
 One of the largest unknowns facing carbon projects is the fate of the carbon market.  
Moreover, it is hard to gauge investor interest in project development due to the market’s high 
volatility and lack of regulations in developed countries (Boyd et al., 2007).  Quantifying 
ancillary benefits of carbon projects (i.e. avoided soil erosion and ground water protection) to 
increase the overall cost-effectiveness and justification of a carbon project is also difficult (Boyd 
et al., 2007).  To garner international investor support in carbon projects, marketing efforts that 
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link carbon forestry projects to CDM and voluntary markets are necessary (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).              
In cases of landowner disenchantment, incompetent project intermediaries hamper the 
financial success of the project (Corbera et al., 2008).  Project proposals are notorious for leaving 
informational and logistical gaps in project implementation, and effective structuring of 
proposals are keystone for long-term landowner acceptance and retention (Pagiola, 2008).  
Likewise, service providers are often unable to conceptualize carbon project design, 
implementation and interactions, initially creating information asymmetry in the power 
relationships between intermediaries and sellers (Wunder et al., 2008).  In one case in southern 
Mexico, the financial architecture of a project contributed to inequalities in payment access, 
resulting in disputes among farmers and communities (Corbera et al., 2007).  Government PES 
programs, on average, are less promising in ensuring conditional payments because financing is 
front-loaded (Wunder et al., 2008).  Government funding can also be quickly siphoned, which 
affects funding flows for receiving service providers.  Nonetheless, once government payments 
stop flowing to the individual, land use management either plateaus or tapers due to lack of 
financial incentives.  International policy developments, however, will ultimately dictate the 
payment system type of carbon PES projects (Corbera et al., 2008).            
Overall, carbon PES schemes in countries have tapped a new economic market that 
values the service of carbon sequestration as an ecosystem service (Cobera et al., 2008).  Put 
differently, reforestation is a valued service for climate regulation.  Whereas a market for this 
valuation did not previously exist before the 1990s, PES financial structures are newfound 
pillars.  Local communities have benefited from equitable payments and adopted organizational 
skills surrounding forest management (Corbera et al., 2008).  A valuable lesson learned is to 
ensure a certain level of project capacity and to foster greater understanding among all 
cooperating actors through both government and private intermediaries (Corbera et al., 2008).  
Not only must the service provider feel she is capturing value, she must understand the 
deliverables of a PES scheme on an elementary level (Cobera et al., 2008).  This, in part, can be 
communicated through well-structured project proposals and contracts that establish long-term 
financial mechanisms for payments (Biermann, 2007).     
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In the future, carbon payments should place higher emphasis on avoided deforestation, as 
in the case of REDD, to introduce new types of contracts and to increase service provider 
participation (Corbera et al., 2008).  PES participation is voluntary based on the consideration of 
other opportunity costs, and PES should continue to provide an attractive incentive to forgo 
alternative degrading land uses.  Similarly, PES carbon contracts are perhaps the best insurance 
against project failure and information asymmetry between contract provider and service 
provider (Peskett et al., 2007).  A better understanding of project capacity discrepancies between 
government-led and user-led programs warrants specific research.  According to Wunder et al., 
private initiatives, compared to government programs, provide more targeted and negotiated 
payments between the intermediary and service provider (2008).  It is crucial to erode impending 
barriers to project participation such as conflicting actor interests and incentives, non-land 
holding service providers, and conflicting environmental policies across scales and countries.   
Further research should consider human behavior changes as a result of improved PES 
incentives, which could theoretically contribute to the integrity of carbon programs and 
ecosystem services (Biermann, 2007).  Furthermore, the coexistence of government and 
intermediary programs is a powerful and overlooked requirement to diminish contradictory 
policies and actions across carbon programs.  Government and intermediary dissonance deters 
participation and amounts to potential service provider confusion of PES design and incentives 
(Biermann, 2007).  In that sense, geographical and political scales and contexts are important 
considerations for the service provider (Corbera et al., 2008).  Additionally, multiple actors can 
complicate cooperation, and therefore, undercut design system and goals (Corbera et al., 2008).  
Therefore, a well-structured system transfers clear incentives from one actor to the next, which 
has simultaneously bolstered international support for projects and maximized actor cooperation.  
Project intermediaries should be held accountable to develop a clear set of rules that define 
actors’ rights and responsibilities and project oversight (Biermann, 2007).  They should also be 
responsible for developing new and adaptable project frameworks that deliver payments over 
longer periods of time.  Corbera et al. maintain that payments are not always an absolute; service 
providers feel more engaged in their projects when payments are attractive and the benefits of 
social and environmental good are equally authenticated (2008).    
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REFOREST THE TROPICS’ MODEL FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC FARM 
FORESTRY IN COSTA RICA 
 Reforest The Tropics, Inc. (RTT) is a privately funded 501(c)(3) non-profit organization 
and UNFCCC-AIJ (Activities Implemented Jointly) Climate Change Program and Sponsored 
Carbon-Offset Program based in Mystic, Connecticut.  Since it received its license to operate a 
UNFCCC project in 1995, RTT has been making a tangible and active contribution to global 
climate change through environmental education in schools and applied research on carbon-
offset economic farm forests in the Turrialba region of Costa Rica.  Approved by both the U.S. 
and Costa Rican governments, its initial project was to manage a U.S. Initiative on Joint 
Implementation (USIJI).  In addition, the state of Connecticut recognizes RTT as a way for its 
citizens to voluntarily offset their carbon emissions.  In the present UN Program, RTT is the 
project manager of 148 hectares (ha) of tropical forest research plots for 80 U.S. donor accounts.  
The organization’s own justification for innovative applied research relies on three principles: 
1. Climate change and carbon sequestration are important issues, and therefore, merit 
research funding. 
2. Costs of RTT are small. 
3. Probability of success in long term carbon capture and storage is high.    
RTT uses this justification for applied research because there are other worthy causes for 
forest sponsor donations.  
 RTT establishes linkage between U.S. carbon dioxide emitters (i.e. schools, small 
businesses, and corporations) and farmers and their forests in Costa Rica, underscoring the 
notion that effects of climate change are global.  Linkage is connecting U.S. carbon emitters and 
farmers in Costa Rica via photos, forest management reports, and wood signs in the forests.  In 
RTT’s model, emitters of carbon dioxide fund demonstration projects in Costa Rica to offset 
their emissions in the U.S.        
Tropical forests are a major sink of carbon dioxide.  As such, carbon sequestration in tropical 
forests is the important niche within the broader range of climate change strategies that RTT 
chooses to occupy.  RTT creates a case for carbon sequestration in tropical forest trees.  
Similarly, applied research makes a solid case for demonstration tropical farm forests in Costa 
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Rica.  RTT estimates the cost of carbon dioxide sequestration in tropical forests to be within a 
targeted range of $8-$15 per metric ton (MT).  A more in-depth explanation of how RTT arrived 
at these numbers will be discussed in the Financial Analysis section.  In addition, RTT aims to 
deliver more benefits such as increased thinning incomes to its contracted farmers and ecosystem 
service provisioning.   
Provided that U.S. carbon dioxide emitters are heedful of climate change mitigation options, 
they prioritize based on incurred costs.  RTT also makes the financial case for forest offsets over 
other climate mitigation efforts.  Nevertheless, emitters can select the mitigation efforts they find 
worthy of financing.  Among competing options are purchasing Renewable Energy Credits 
(RECs) from wind power, installing solar panels, and purchasing offsets on the voluntary carbon 
market.  A sponsored forest through RTT can generate a line of carbon credits for the donor over 
a 25-year contract lifetime.  However, the forest sponsor cannot sell these offsets on the 
voluntary carbon market.  Currently, the donor is not deriving direct commercial earnings from 
its offsets.  Rather, the string of offsets has good-will and theoretical offset value because RTT is 
in a demonstration and research phase.  With further expansion, RTT could reach an investment 
stage, especially if the government requires small and medium-sized U.S. emitters to balance 
their emissions.  In addition, regulation is a factor that could theoretically place more value on 
stored carbon.  For instance, the U.S. government might regulate emitters by forcing them to 
offset their emissions at a price of $10/MT.  When regulation has a stranglehold on emitters, 
stored carbon that was a previously frozen asset becomes an added income overnight.  That is, if 
an emitter already has captured carbon dioxide, the emitter would not have to pay $10/MT.  In an 
alternative situation, it might cost emitters $30/MT in the future to emit carbon.  RTT posits that 
forest carbon capture will be cheaper when firms are required to offset in the future. Therefore, 
carbon is gaining a greater economic value due to increasing demand to offset.      
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Figure 1.  RTT Model for Carbon Sequestration in Costa Rica.  Note: Carbon offsets are the ambiguous part of 
the model because their value is variable.  Diagram courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, Director, Reforest The Tropics 
Inc.              
The key rule governing carbon sequestration in economic farm forests is additionality, as 
set forth by the UN for the Kyoto Protocol’s three mechanisms.  Moreover, RTT makes the case 
for reforestation, rather than forest conservation, because already existing tropical forests do not 
count as new carbon sinks.  Forests must be planted on land in addition to pre-existing forests for 
existing forests to serve as the benchmark from which to work.  In the same vein, the UN 
addresses the problem of leakage.  In this context, leakage refers to the unanticipated increase in 
carbon emissions outside of a project’s accounting boundary that results from an aggregation of 
the project’s activities (Schwarze et al., 2002).  Leakage is a concept that pertains to reforestation 
and afforestation projects in developing countries.  In RTT’s case, gasoline is required for cars 
and trucks to access forests.  With respect to leakage, emissions created are also emissions 
deducted from total carbon dioxide capture and storage in forests.   
RTT has four goals for applied research on demonstration forests in Costa Rica: 
1. Achieve 500 MT carbon sequestration total/hectare/25 years (contract lifetime) 
2. Generate $500 (U.S. dollars)/hectare/year for the farmer 
3. Store carbon dioxide for the long-term (100+ years)  
4. 40 MT/hectare/year of stored carbon  
Furthermore, assuming a 20 MT/year yield rate for carbon storage * 25 years of an RTT 
contract with a farmer = goal of 500 MT/hectare carbon storage over the lifetime of a RTT 
contract.   
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 To achieve its goals, RTT is a designer of forests.  RTT hones mixed-species forest 
management and design to help ensure biological survival and long-term, 100+ year carbon 
storage.  On average, RTT plants 5-6 tree species, some of which include fast-growing tree 
species that are readily available for the farmer’s first thinning income and some of which are 
slow-growing species to allow for subsequent thinnings.  In particular, RTT has begun to plant 
cedar trees in its forests because cedar commands a high price on the timber market.  In direct 
contrast to conventional wood harvesting, RTT does not thin its best growing trees.  Rather, it 
thins the second best tree to enhance the growth rate of the best tree through reduced 
competition.  Thinnings in its new model are expected starting at year 8 and every four years 
after (year 12, 16, 20, and 24.)  Whereas loggers have little incentive to place a value on stored 
carbon, RTT points to clear incentives.  To ensure a lasting value, RTT’s partial harvesting 
system is a 20 percent reduction in forest biomass, leaving the best trees in the ground.  The 
standing trees take on an economic value for stored carbon, even if they are not thinned for 
commercial use.  In the contract with a farmer, he agrees that RTT will manage the forest for the 
contract duration.  That said, loggers who are contracted to cut trees do not always follow the 
forest manager’s instructions, prompting considerations for how to avoid this problem.  In an 
attempt to ensure future forest management provisioning, RTT must maintain strong 
relationships with its farmers.  As a consolation, the farmer also has 12 years before he exhausts 
carbon payments, which will be discussed in the Financial Analysis.    
 
Figure 2.  RTT Farmer Income from Thinnings.  Diagram A represents a logger’s harvest.  The light green box in 
the top left-hand corner represents a 20 percent harvest of the best trees (highest quality and fastest growing).  The 
rest of the trees left behind are lower qualities that are not conducive for commercial sale or for long-term carbon 
storage.  Diagram B represents RTT’s 20 percent competitive thinning program.  The biggest competitor (red with 
stars) to the best trees (yellow) are thinned.  An aggregate of leaving the best trees behind lends to long-term carbon 
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storage.  Trees are different shapes, sizes, and spaces apart to represent RTT diverse forest design.  Diagram 
courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, Director, Reforest The Tropics, Inc.              
RTT’s Environmental Payments for Incremental Carbon Capture (EPICC) Model 
 Paramount to RTT’s nearly 20 years of applied research is a new and innovative model 
dubbed Environmental Payments for Incremental Carbon Capture (EPICC) that is currently 
being tested.  The EPICC model closely mirrors a ‘pay-as-you-go’ plan for sequestered carbon.  
It is designed, in particular, with the farmer and his overall financial well-being in mind.  Part of 
this model assumes that RTT is sharing the future value of stored carbon with a farmer.  That is, 
a farmer captures the value of wood in a standing tree after thinnings.  The thrust of this model, 
however, is rendering reforestation financially compelling for farmers and capturing and storing 
carbon on behalf of the U.S. emitter.  This model initially offers free technical assistance to the 
farmer with a $2,000 grant.  At this point, the $2,000 grant presells carbon credits for the 25 year 
contract.  The EPICC model introduces annual carbon payments for the farmer at the end of year 
4 of the contract, hence, payments for incremental carbon capture (i.e. no payment until year 4).  
RTT is paying a landowner for annual and incremental carbon capture in forests.  The cash flow 
for carbon payments continues until a payment ceiling of $2000, which is expected to occur at 
the end of year 12.  Above all, the EPICC model positively manipulates the farmer’s cash flow in 
three important ways: a) jumpstarts farmer cash flow earlier in the contract, b) diversifies her 
income depending on competing options which are addressed in this study, c) and closes the gap 
between long periods (3-4 years) without income.                        
Costa Rican National Payments for Ecosystem Services Program 
 Costa Rica has declared its goal to become the world’s first carbon neutral country by 
2021.  Notably, half of the country’s land is covered by forests, posing significant geographic 
competitive advantage.  Officials are focused on converting pastured land used for agricultural 
crops and cattle ranching into reforested areas by planting 7 million trees on roughly 50,000 
plantations (Boddiger, 2012).  According to the World Bank, forestry efforts alone will be the 
largest barometer of success: approximately 72 percent of the 2021 goal will be met through 
forestry.  Not surprisingly, there is a growing demand in Costa Rica for land on which to plant 
forests (World Bank, 2013).     
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Figure 3.  Costa Rica’s Government Model.  The government maintains 400,000 hectares of tropical forests at all 
time, where dark green represents 400,000 hectares of tropical forests, red represents a logged section of mature 
tropical forests, and light green represents a new planting of immature forests to compensate for the red area.  The 
logged section of immature forests results in less total stored carbon, and ultimately, represents a net loss.  Diagram 
courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, Director, Reforest The Tropics, Inc.              
FONAFIFO, a Spanish acronym, is the governing body that collects PES funds and is 
responsible for the overall management five PES forest activity categories in Costa Rica—
protection, reforestation, regeneration, forest management and agroforestry.  The current 
government PES model for reforestation offers a landowner $980/ha/contract for agreeing to 
plant any tree species (regular reforestation) and $1470/ha/contract for agreeing to plant native 
species (Porras et al., 2013). Payments are offered for a contract period of 15 years, but are only 
issued during the first five years of the contract.  A landowner in Costa Rica receives an average 
$1,000/ha/contract to reforest pastured land that was previously used for crops or for cattle 
ranching (Porras et al., 2013).   
In Costa Rica, there is cultural pressure to plant native trees even though there is a mantra 
of critics that advocate for exotic species.  Originally, farmers were planting native species as 
part of the 2021 plan for carbon neutrality.  However, native trees are slower growing than non-
native species, and consequently, farmers have turned to primarily monoculture plantings.  
Lastly, these monocultures are cut down within 5-8 years after planting because there is little 
incentive to keep them in the ground.  They are susceptible to mass decimation from disease due 
lack of genetic diversity.  On the other hand, the Costa Rican government is trying to establish 
the right medium through which to sell its carbon offsets.  In the past few years, Costa Rica has 
captured more than 90 million tons of carbon dioxide.  However, due to the lack of an 
international compliance market on which to sell its carbon offsets, the country is focusing its 
efforts on a national market for buying and selling carbon credits (Salazar, 2014).  These saleable 
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offsets are traded among businesses, organizations, and individuals seeking to offset 
‘unavoidable’ emissions (Salazar, 2014).  Ultimately, Costa Rica plans to establish an 
international carbon market with credits flowing from forestry activities (Salazar, 2014).     
     
Figure 4. Costa Rican National PES Model for Reforestation.  Diagram courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, Director, 
Reforest The Tropics, Inc.              
The Role of Carbon Markets  
 It is difficult to estimate the true economic value of carbon offsets, which come in all 
sizes.  In the case of carbon sequestration projects, carbon offset prices are not usually realized 
until the time of sale on the voluntary carbon market.  This reality is, in part, attributed to the 
volatile nature of the voluntary carbon market.  Surprisingly, price ambiguity and information 
asymmetry do not deter emitters from taking part in the market and emitters are willing to pay 
for carbon sequestration.  If Congress were to enact more cap and trade policies to reduce 
emissions, the value of a carbon offset would theoretically increase by multiple factors.    
Companies called brokers list daily price fluctuations and connect buyers to sellers in one 
transparent and virtual space.  Brokers also host auctions to report cleared prices, where 
purchased offsets are then removed from the market.  Although corporations are offsetting their 
emissions through purchases on the voluntary market, prices remain highly volatile and low 
(BGC, 2014).  Offsets qualify as Kyoto emission reduction mechanisms—usually as CERs.  
Another class of instruments called Verified Emissions Reductions, or VERs, are comparable to 
CERs.  Namely, companies purchase VERs because they are generated through small-scale 
projects that do not go through the UN certification process (BCG, 2014).  In particular, 
voluntary demand for carbon offsets increased four percent in 2012 when buyers funneled $523 
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million into the market to offset 101 million MT of carbon (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2013).  
Buyers in 2012 paid a volume-weighted average price of $5.9/ton, slightly trailing 2011’s 
$6.2/ton.  Whereas the 2011 and 2012 average prices remained low, they were higher than the 
UN’s regulatory offset price, which was less than $1/ton (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2013).  
Lastly, as governments ratchet down on regulations, the value of carbon is expected to rise.     
Leading companies such as Chevrolet offset carbon dioxide, suggesting that companies 
are trying to actively shape the climate game.  Therefore, governments should not underestimate 
companies’ willingness to place a meaningful value on carbon (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2013).  
Conversely, offset critics posit that the carbon market does not fix the biophysical problem of 
taking excess carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere via carbon sequestration.  As in the case of 
CDM or REDD, emissions on the carbon market are simply substituted and displaced by one 
country to another using a voucher-like transaction.  In all, the carbon market can place a value 
on an ‘offset,’ but what it seldom captures is the value of carbon sequestration to society (i.e. 
what is it worth to society to avoid another five Hurricane Sandys because of reduced parts per 
million in the atmosphere).   
RTT versus the Costa Rica Government PES Program for Reforestation  
 RTT is capturing its own strain of value by creating ecologically and economically 
sustainable farm forests.  Most foresters will do a 30 percent thinning, compared to RTT’s 20 
percent thinning, taking more biomass out of forests without the intent of long-term carbon 
storage.  Likewise, it is rare for a forester to thin using a 30 percent rate, let alone a 20 percent 
one.  RTT attempts to ensure that farmers’ behavior will follow the RTT ideal through 
maintaining a strong and long-lasting relationship with the farmer.  For example, RTT shares 
forest growth information, places a sign in the forest designating the sponsor, and meets in 
person with the farmer to discuss forest management.      
 Alternatively, since local people in the tropics live off the land, it is important to consider 
the opportunity costs of alternative land uses.  Therefore, the Costa Rican government and RTT 
models are similar in that they try to outcompete the opportunity costs of alternative land uses for 
the same person, on the same land, and at the same time.  Thus, the only factors that change the 
equation are the ‘what’ (i.e. from what is the farmer generating income—forest conservation, 
cattle ranching?) and ‘why’ (why is the farmer cattle ranching over planting trees—is she 
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receiving a higher return?)  In general, an opportunity cost is defined as the cost of a foregone 
opportunity.  An opportunity cost in the Costa Rican context is what a landowner could be 
earning in lieu of a reforestation project.  Therefore, with other factors held equal, a farmer can 
decide to pursue the Costa Rica PES scheme, RTT’s model, or a project through REDD/REDD+ 
as a means to sell carbon on the carbon market.  Ultimately, for the cash-strapped landowner, the 
payoff scheme is what will make her foreclose on one opportunity, and pursue another.  
Admittedly, these three models must consider each other as potential opportunity costs.  In this 
study, the notion of opportunity costs is extended to include both forgone profit and ‘forgone 
revenue’ because the costs of cattle ranching are estimated, and therefore, forgone profit is, too.    
EXPLANATION OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS   
 A financial analysis is conducted to demonstrate a value proposition that carbon 
sequestration provides a valuable return on a farmer’s property.  Carbon sequestration is defined 
by a set of distinct biophysical compositions and parameters.  The goal of the financial analysis 
is to create a value proposition that carbon sequestration provides a valuable return using RTT’s 
forests as a base case.  In light of the notion of opportunity cost, the financial analysis will take 
into consideration alternative land uses and the payments for each alternative use.  Additionally, 
the analysis will adopt the perspective of a land owner in Costa Rica, framing each case in a way 
that illustrates options available to a farmer.  
      Biophysical carbon sequestration data points are combined with a financial analysis as a way 
to commodify RTT’s stored carbon in forests.  By starting with raw quantities of sequestered 
carbon dioxide expressed in metric tons (MT) in RTT’s forests and ascribing these quantities 
different prices of carbon, an overall value for stored carbon is calculated.  Carbon payments are 
made on an annual cycle and are a function of biophysical conditions (climate, fertile soil, and 
natural weather events).  Therefore, Scenario A will manipulate biophysical data and highlight 
tree species and forest management practices employed in RTT’s theoretical base case for carbon 
sequestration.  Above all, carbon prices ($/MT) are an important consideration for how to create 
bona fide carbon products in Scenario C.  Similarly, carbon prices can affect the landowner’s 
cash flow, and depending on the price of carbon, alternative land uses can become more 
appealing to the landowner.  RTT’s EPICC model, Scenario A, is currently testing a fixed unit 
price of $5/MT for carbon payments.  Next, there is a table comparing Scenario A with capped 
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carbon payments at $2,000 using $5/MT and Scenario B, a hypothetical uncapped EPICC carbon 
payment plan using different fixed unit prices of carbon.  Capped carbon payments in Scenario B 
refer to a payment ceiling for the amount a farmer can earn from annual increments of stored 
carbon.  In Scenario A, there is a $2000 payment ceiling, or cap on carbon payments, for annual 
increments of stored carbon because of funding limitations.       
 Eight scenarios are studied based on varying several parameters using an analytical 
framework.  The parameters that are altered to distinguish the scenarios are labeled as followed: 
A) capped carbon payments, B) uncapped carbon payments, C) different fixed unit prices of 
carbon, uncapped carbon payments and different fixed unit prices of carbon, D) opportunity 
costs of cattle ranching (revenues and profits), E) Costa Rica’s PES program, F) variable unit 
prices of carbon, G) comparison of NPVs and present values for RTT and competitors, H) and 
the variable costs of carbon, respectively.  Since RTT is a base scenario for capped carbon 
payments at $5/MT up to $2,000, parameters, for example, such as Costa Rica’s PES program 
and uncapped carbon payments are compartmentalized as variations.  Tables in the Results 
section each represent a unique scenario that varies a specific parameter. 
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Scenario 
Name 
Parameter 
Description 
Initial 
Payment 
Annual 
Payment 
Payment/Hectare Payment/Metric 
Ton 
A RTT EPICC 
Base Case
+ 
$2,000 $0-$2976 $34,065 for contract $5 fixed for 
contract 
B RTT EPICC 
Uncapped 
Carbon 
Payments at 
$5/Metric Ton
+ 
$2,000 $150-$3126 $36,085 for contract $5 fixed for 
contract 
C RTT Capped 
and Uncapped 
Carbon 
Payments Using 
Different 
Carbon Prices 
$2,000 Varied based 
on carbon price 
(see Table C) 
Varied based on 
carbon price (see 
Table C) 
$3,$7, $5, or $9 
fixed for contract 
D Opportunity 
Costs of Cattle 
Ranching
+
 
N/A $0-500 $0-500 N/A 
E Costa Rica’s 
Payments for 
Ecosystem 
Services 
Program
 
(1 ha)
+ 
$980/ha or 
$1470/ha 
$980 or $1470 
for 5 years 
$980 or $1470 
($1225 average) 
$2.73 
F RTT EPICC 
Uncapped 
Variable Unit 
Price of 
Carbon
+ 
$2,000 N/A N/A $5 for years 1-12, 
$7 for years 13-
20 and $9 for 
years 21-25 
G Comparison of 
RTT Net 
Present Values 
and Present 
Values of Cattle 
Ranching and 
Costa Rica 
PES+ 
N/A Varied based 
on carbon cap, 
type of price 
(fixed or 
variable) and 
price of carbon 
N/A Varied (Refer to 
Scenarios A, B, 
C, and F) 
H Social Costs of 
Carbon and 
California Cap 
and Trade 
N/A N/A N/A Varied (See Table 
H) 
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Table 1.  Summary Table for Financial Analysis, Scenarios A-H.  
+
Denotes scenarios that incorporate both 
regular and discounted cash flows.  Table letters correspond to Scenario Names.  N/A means Not Applicable.     
Estimated cattle ranching opportunity costs in Costa Rica are compared to RTT’s farmer 
income data for an entire contract in Scenario D.  Comparing the estimated opportunity costs of 
cattle ranching using three estimated annual averaged costs—$150/ha/year, $300/ha/year and 
$450/ha/year—represents the landowner’s perspective.  For the highest opportunity cost of cattle 
ranching ($500/ha/year), there is a carbon price that gives an identical return to a landowner on 
the same plot of land.  By the same token, a ‘break even’ carbon price also is calculated.  This 
price is defined as the price of carbon that generates an income that is equal to the income from 
the highest estimated averaged annual opportunity cost of cattle ranching.  It reveals the 
minimum price of carbon needed to outcompete feasible maximum opportunity costs of cattle 
ranching.  Scenario D features both concepts of opportunity costs specific to this study—forgone 
revenue in Figure D and forgone profit in Figure D-1.    
Because PES programs are expressed in a $/hectare metric, conversions from this metric 
to a $/MT as in RTT’s model is a multi-step process in Scenario E.  Also, the analysis will 
calculate the differences in farmer cash flow through data on carbon using RTT’s most recent 
theoretical data that achieves 40 MT/ha/year in Scenario A.  As a result, there will be insight on 
what the farmer could make if the forests achieved this optimal scenario, according to RTT.  
Furthermore, to more closely match RTT’s project scope, the Costa Rica PES program was 
extended to 25 years, or two PES contracts in Scenario E.   
  RTT’s contract with farmers serves as a base case in Scenario A.  That said, adopting the 
landowner’s perspective is imperative to understanding the comparisons and contrasts between 
the different variations on the base case.  To add further richness to the financial analysis, we 
created a scenario using RTT’s EPICC model that does not feature a fixed unit price of $5/MT 
for the contract duration.  Rather, Scenario F will ascribe a variable unit carbon price of $5/MT 
starting at year 4 until year 12, the year at which carbon payments would be exhausted in 
Scenario A.  Starting in year 13, the unit price of carbon changes to $7/MT until year 20, and 
then increases to $9/MT from year 21 to 25 to showcase a scenario where RTT incentivizes 
forest management by conditionally raising carbon prices for the farmer.  Consequently, the 
landowner will have an added consideration for a different financial structure.   
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The California Cap and Trade Program is also a variation on the financial analysis as part 
of the variable costs of carbon parameter in Scenario H.  Through the California program, 
avoided greenhouse gas emissions could come from reforestation activities in developing 
countries.  In Scenario H, we hypothetically enroll one of RTT’s hectares in the California Cap 
and Trade Program.  In this case, the California Cap and Trade Program is its own stand-alone 
program.  Lastly, firms in the U.S. are ascribing different values to a unit of carbon dioxide.  
Scenario H will also disclose a few cited prices of carbon for which U.S. firms have been willing 
to pay in the past year.   
          Revenues and costs are handled using an accounting approach.  Both costs and revenue 
streams are expressed in both regular and discounted cash flows.  The accounting stance pertains 
to the landowner’s perspective only.  In the landowner’s situation, costs include either five forest 
thinnings or costs associated with cattle ranching.  On the other hand, net present values will be 
compared between the incoming and outgoing cash flows of cattle ranching and carbon 
sequestration on an annual basis in Scenario D.  
Discount rates are employed to provide sensitivity analysis with respect to the case 
scenarios.  Discount rates are used in the field of environmental economics to account for the 
time value of money.  By doing so, future values are translated into a common present value 
metric (Traeger, 2009).  Essentially, discounting is a way of assessing society’s willingness to 
tradeoff present for future benefits.  Discount rates are, therefore, an indispensable key parameter 
in environment policy-making decisions (NOAA, 2014).  Discounting is an interest rate (r) used 
to derive a net present value (NPV).  A NPV is an annualized value calculated by finding the 
sum of all benefits expressed in present value less the sum of all costs expressed in present value 
(Traeger, 2009).  Discounting postulates that money today is worth more than the same amount 
of money in the future through the process of compounding with interest (Traeger, 2009).  As 
such, opportunity costs must be considered; if money is not being invested today, it can be put 
towards something else today.    
Analysts usually conduct sensitivity analysis with different interest rates.  That said, the 
financial analysis will utilize a couple different discount rates based on past literature reviews.  
Cases A, B, D, E and F, however, will use discount rates of 3, 6, and 9 percent to account for a 
range of rates, and to also account for different weights on future financial flows (refer to Table 
1).  Specifically, a higher interest rate such as 9 percent will discount the future more heavily and 
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place more weight on the present (Traeger, 2009).  In light of these tradeoffs between present 
and future benefits and costs, choosing an interest rate can be controversial in environmental 
policy situations (Traeger, 2009).  Therefore, the analysis will use one lower-bound discount rate 
of 3 percent to produce one set of results.  Subsequently, the upper-bound discount rate of 9 
percent will derive a different set of results.  Interestingly, climate economists advocate for an 
application of mixed discount rates for long-term carbon reduction projects (Traeger, 2009).  
Therefore, an analysis of descending discount rates is appraised against conventional discounting 
approaches in Scenario E.  A comparison of NPVs for RTT’s model and the Costa Rican 
government program is analogous to the landowner’s private decision-making process.  
Inevitably, farmers need to have a strong understanding of what discounting means for future 
costs and benefits and how NPVs might affect their decision making processes.     
 To demonstrate the significance of the financial analysis in this study, RTT might 
consider sharing the results with potential or interested landowners in Costa Rica.  Moreover, 
one key product that results from this study is a contractual infrastructure that RTT could use as 
a marketing tool.  Having estimated the opportunity costs of cattle ranching associated with its 
model, RTT could more effectively structure a contract with a landowner.  Ideally, RTT could 
explain this study’s results to a landowner and how he should think about carbon sequestration as 
an overall economically feasible and tangible enterprise in Costa Rica.             
Assumptions of Analysis 
Costs— In RTT’s model, costs can be unreliable for several reasons.  In this study, costs proved 
more difficult to research than benefits and possess a greater degree of uncertainty.  Thinning 
costs are highly varied since farmers are hesitant to do an initial thinning; loggers are notorious 
for bribing and cheating farmers and landowners in Costa Rica.  The relative location of a logged 
tree to a road can also affect thinning costs.  Trees that fall close to roads require very low 
thinning costs; conversely, logged trees can fall beyond economic hauling distance.  Similarly, 
Costa Rica has very stringent forestry laws, which can deter farmers from thinning for the first 
time.  Thinning costs are calculated using an estimated 30 percent of the lowest priced wood, 
Ceibo/Chanco, published by the National Forestry Office in Costa Rica (ONF, 2013).  In that 
context, thinning costs are an estimated $11.86/m3 for each thinning after converting costs from 
the Costa Rican colon to the U.S. dollar (1 colon = 0.0018 U.S. dollars, April 2014).  Also, the 
estimated cost of thinning per m3 is the same for all five thinning periods in RTT’s model.  
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However, the volume of thinnings increases each thinning from year 8 to year 24.  Conversely, 
costs associated with cattle ranching were consulted using literature on deforestation, climate 
change and RTT.  However, according to RTT, a ballpark cost estimate for cattle ranching in the 
Turrialba region of Costa Rica is $250/ha/year.          
Opportunity costs— The opportunity costs of cattle ranching (forgone revenues) in Costa Rica 
can vary, depending on the purpose for cattle ranching—beef, dairy, or hide—and on the size of 
the cattle farm.  According to RTT, a cattle farmer in the central region of Costa Rica can earn 
from $0-500/ha/year, hinging on the efficiency of farm operations.  Specifically, a farmer of a 
well-managed and large cattle farm can earn the upper-bound income (around $500/ha/year.)  
The financial analysis will feature three annual averaged revenues of cattle ranching: $150/year, 
$300/year, and $450/year to reflect a realistic range of farmer revenues. However, there are other 
opportunity costs that are not taken into account in this study.  For instance, the opportunity costs 
of growing crops such as bananas, sugar cane, plantains, or coffee, common sources of 
landowner income in Costa Rica, should not be dismissed altogether.  This study acknowledges 
they exist, but instead focuses on the Costa Rican government model and cattle ranching as the 
main competitors of RTT’s EPICC model.  Even though opportunity costs should use a concept 
of forgone profit only, forgone revenues are an important component in Scenario D because 
forgone profit was harder to estimate than forgone revenue.     
Risks— Growing agricultural products is risky, yet carbon sequestration has its own risks.  The 
risks associated with growing crops are different from forest management, nevertheless.  
Agriculture has shorter time horizons, and therefore, quicker turnover with returns.  The cycles 
for crops and timber are also not in alignment.  A farmer builds up carbon stocks using a layered 
forest design.  Bio-stability is the farmer’s hedge against future forest damages.  Farmers should 
be cognizant of biophysical risks: fires, volcanoes, lightening, pests, and decaying trees.  Forest 
design (selection of species), site (soil drainage, previous land use, and rainfall) and forest 
management (replanting and cleaning) comprise another catalogue of biophysical risks.  
Alternatively, there are attenuated risks associated with a potential dis-enchanted farmer who 
either abandons the reforestation contract or skirts his duties as a contracted forest caretaker.           
RTT’s Model—RTT’s carbon sequestration data are theoretically projected estimates from 
experimental trials.  Actual results will be developed as RTT’s research unfolds and as the 
demonstration forests grow and are properly managed.  For the time being, an optimistic 
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scenario is a stand-in for real results that will be confirmed over time.  These biophysical data 
points also assume a rough one-year recuperation time for trees after a thinning, and thinnings 
are 14 percent reductions instead of 20 percent.  The biological resilience of RTT’s forests will 
be confirmed over time.  The use of forest mixtures is likely to determine the level of biological 
resilience.    
RTT’s Intellectual Basis of Forests:  
1. MT (metric ton of carbon dioxide) is roughly equal to a m3 (cubic meter) of 
wood, depending on wood density and the science of carbon sequestration;  
2. 20 MT of stored carbon is for the emitter’s carbon offsets and 20 m3 wood is 
for a farmer to thin, for a total goal of 40 MT/hectare/year of stored carbon, 
and;   
3. a MT CO2 =CO2e, where CO2e is carbon dioxide emissions equivalents 
These are assumptions for RTT’s carbon sequestration data.  These assumptions are also 
a function of contract enforcement, project verification, and monitoring.  RTT contracts a U.S. 
forestry consultant to conduct audits of its forests and to comment on the value of its applied 
research.  Yet again, due to the research scope of this study, verification and monitoring are not 
included as ancillary categories of farmer costs.     
Basis for farmer income from thinnings are estimated in this study and calculated as 
following: 
1. $500/year and 20 m3 going to the farmer for income 
2. $500/year = 20 m3 * $/m3 
3. $500/$20 = $25, or $25/m3 
Therefore, the farmer must sell logs at a minimum price of $25/m3 to achieve RTT’s goal 
of $500/hectare/year to the farmer.  Trees from older forests produce a higher percentage of 
commercial wood because of increased growth, which should yield higher prices for thinnings at 
the tail-end of the RTT contract.  Commercial utilization refers to the estimated percentage of a 
stump that is saleable for commercial use.  RTT uses a conservative estimate for prices of wood 
stumps, or $55/m3, which is also the lowest price of a wood stump as indicated by the National 
Forest Office in Costa Rica (National Forest Office, 2013).  Thus, the rationale for using a 
conservative price for logs is to provide a realistic estimate for farmer thinnings.  For example, a 
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high-value species such as Cedar commands $218/m3 and Pilon, a medium-value species, 
commands $72/m3 (National Forest Office, 2013).  RTT plants both species in its forests.  
Therefore, a metric of $55/m3 is used for all thinnings in Table A-1 because it is a point between 
$25/m3 and realistic prices of wood.  Commercial utilization is also taken into account in the 
analysis.  Lastly, RTT’s base case carbon payments are fixed for the duration of the contract at 
$5/MT in Scenario A.  However, this price is subject to change depending on the compliance and 
voluntary carbon markets and on new forest plantings and new contracts.  RTT uses this price 
because a) it is the breakeven carbon price for the highest cattle ranching opportunity cost 
(forgone revenue) b) carbon payments are capped at $2,000 and c) RTT refers to both regulatory 
and voluntary markets as a reference price.  More comparisons of RTT’s fixed unit price and 
other carbon prices will be discussed later.    
Scenario A comprises the base case for RTT’s new EPICC model.  This scenario is 
instrumental in understanding the relationship between factors linked to the farmer’s average 
income over 25 years.  Some longitudinal carbon sequestration data points are 40/MT/ha/year 
until year 13, and then decrease to 30 MT/ha/year.  The important aspect is that these data points 
are linked together.  Achieving 40 MT/ha/year is one of RTT’s goals, but it is an optimistic 
scenario that informs how much money the farmer could theoretically make in an optimal 
situation.  The effects of RTT’s actions in the forest are reflected in a farmer’s income.  This case 
is also based on the presumption that the forest has a one year recuperation time after each 
thinning to achieve its year-end accumulated carbon in the previous year.  It is also based on a 
four-year thinning cycle to promote a managed forest.  Note that this optimistic case achieves 
RTT’s goal of 500 MT in stored carbon for the emitter over the 25-year contract.  Because RTT 
achieved this goal, finding the price of a carbon offset in its model is calculated as such:  
1. RTT receives $7500 from a U.S. carbon emitter for one hectare under EPICC   
2. A $7500 donation/500 MT total sequestration = $15/MT for the emitter to balance its 
emissions in the U.S. over 25 years.  In addition, this case achieves RTT’s dual goal 
of $500/ha/year for farmer average income.   
On a side note, the forest sequestered an additional 40 MT in year 12.  The farmer, 
therefore, should earn $200 in carbon payments.  However, since the payments are capped at 
$2000, the farmer had already reached $1870, leaving a remainder of $130, which is what he 
would receive at the end of year 12.  
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Risks in this model include forest design and selection of species; site (soil, drainage, 
quality of land after previous land use, climate, rainfall, temperature); forest management 
(replanting, cleaning, spraying, spaces between plantings, number of seedlings); and other 
natural factors (lightning strikes, floods, wind, and termites).  
The biophysical parameters of this base case scenario are dictated by two types of RTT 
planting models.  The RTT Hi-CO2 Model uses tree species such as Chancho, Pilon and Klinkii.  
The Klinkii tree is conducive for long-term carbon storage in forests.  Next, the RTT Hi-Value 
Model takes advantage of trees such as Deglupta, Cedar, Klinkii, and Mahagony.  The latter 
commands a high price of wood, much like Cedar.  A combination of these models supports 
RTT’s goals: providing thinning income to the farmer and long-term carbon sequestration.  
Lastly, a model in development called Sombra! requires a mixture of species such as Botarrama, 
Mahogony, Maria, Klinkii, and Ocora.  As always, RTT management rules apply (i.e. replanting 
and competitive thinnings). 
This model is not perfect, and has natural limitations.  Additional considerations and 
questions include, but are not limited to: 
1. What type of forest design could achieve these results? 
2. What role does site quality play? 
3. What likely real-world factors could affect these results? 
4. How to integrate forest management with the Costa Rican farm culture? 
Since Scenario A serves as a base case for future parameter considerations, questions 
about RTT’s contract inevitably arise.  One consideration is the cap on carbon payments.  It is 
possible that it could be detrimental.  For example, a farmer who uses the $2000 pool for carbon 
payments by the end of year 10 might have less of an incentive to follow proper forest 
management for the next 15 years, which in turn, would theoretically enhance stored carbon.  
Also, there may be diminished farmer commitment to 20 percent competitive thinnings.  There 
are eventual implications for this kind of behavior.  Moreover, it is important to think of the 
$2000 cap as either an incentive or a disincentive for a farmer’s forest management behavior.  
The effects of this cap are not yet understood since the EPICC model’s results need to be 
confirmed over time.  However, the farmer could abandon the contract once he has reached the 
price ceiling for carbon payments.  More fundamentally, RTT’s model must consider the 25-year 
contract in entirety.  Not only will this force landowners to adopt a long-term mindset about the 
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value of forests, but cash flows from stored carbon should theoretically flow farther into the 
future.  The next best option would extend carbon payments to 25 years.  That in mind, 
incentives for long-term carbon storage may not be realized when there is a $2,000 cap on stored 
carbon, yet RTT is trying to incentivize indefinite carbon storage (100+ years).  It is slightly 
misleading in that carbon is being sequestered for 25 years in the contract, yet payments are 
capped at the end of year 12.   
In an effort to align RTT and farmer incentives, Scenario B will feature uncapped carbon 
payments at a fixed price of $5/MT for the full-length of the contract.  Above all, an uncapped 
carbon payment parameter at $5/MT will reveal how $2,000 stacks up comparatively.  
Furthermore, the purpose of an uncapped carbon payment parameter using different prices of 
carbon ($3/MT, $5/MT, $7/MT, and $9/MT) is to demonstrate how 1) an uncapped model for 
carbon payments incentivizes good forest management and 2) different prices of carbon are at or 
above the breakeven carbon price for the opportunity costs of the PES program and cattle 
ranching.  Additionally, prices of $3/MT, $5/MT, $7/MT and $9/MT are utilized in Scenario C 
based on comparisons of the payments for the Costa Rica PES program and of the $/MT for 
carbon sold on the voluntary market.  A breakdown of the comparison between RTT’s $/MT 
price and the Costa Rica PES $/ha is discussed later in Scenario E.  
RTT’s original data serves as the core analysis for considering different ways to 
contextualize carbon prices.  Over time, the farmer earns a cash flow from managing the forest as 
a carbon sink.  RTT’s longitudinal data is collected over time.  Longitudinal data is a label for 
the total annual carbon increments over 25 years minus the volume of thinnings.  Furthermore, 
RTT’s metric is expressed on a MT/ha basis.  In this case, the metric is 505 MT/ha.  After 
computing this metric, it is inverted to express a hectare/MT metric.  On the other hand, Costa 
Rica’s PES program is expressed using a $/ha metric.  Using an average for landowners who 
plant native and non-native species, the metric is $1225/ha.  The dimensional analysis to back 
out an implicit dollar amount ($/MT) for sequestration is 
($1,225/ha) * (ha/505 MT)  
Hectares cancel out, and thus, $1,225/505 MT = $2.43/MT. 
As a way to contextualize carbon prices, RTT should use at least a $2.43 carbon price in 
order to compete with Costa Rica’s PES program.  Because RTT is currently giving the farmer 
$5/MT, carbon sequestration is a financially viable enterprise for the farmer relative to the PES 
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program.  One consideration is that the PES program is structured as a short program (15-20 
years) relative to RTT.  Therefore, the PES program is extended to two contracts for this to be a 
useful comparison.  Even if the farmer were to receive the lowest $/MT in Table E, $3/ton, the 
farmer is receiving a healthy return relative to the PES scheme.   
RESULTS 
SCENARIO A (RTT EPICC Model Base Case) 
End of yr Growth 
rate/yr 
Yr end 
accumulated 
carbon in 
forest 
MT/CO2e 
before 
thinnings  
Yr end 
volume 
after 
thinning 
1 m3= 1 
MT 
CO2e 
% 
thin 
Volume 
of 
thinning
(m3) 
Carbon 
payments 
@ $5/MT 
up to $2,000 
starting at 
year 4 
Value of 
thinning 
(see Table 
1) 
Model 
initial 
$2,000 
grant, 
carbon 
payments 
and 
thinnings 
Accumulated 
income 
1 5 5      $1000 $1000 
2 19 24      $500 $1500 
3 35 59      $500 $2000 
4 40 99    $495  $495 $2495 
5 40 139    $200  $200 $2695 
6 40 179    $200  $200 $2895 
7 40 219    $200  $200 $3095 
8, thin 40 259 223 14% 36 $200 $798 $998 $4093 
9 35 258    $175  $175 $4268 
10 40 298    $200  $200 $4468 
11 40 338    $200  $200 $4668 
12, thin 40 378 325 14% 53 $130 
(carbon 
payments 
end, reach 
$2,000) 
$1745 $1875 $6543 
13 30 355      $0 $6543 
14 30 385      $0 $6543 
15 30 415      $0 $6543 
16, thin 30 445 383 14% 62  $2398 $2398 $8941 
17 30 413      $0 $8941 
18 30 443      $0 $8941 
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19 30 473      $0 $8941 
20, thin 30 503 432 14% 70  $2709 $2709 $11,650 
21 30 462      $0 $11,650 
22 30 492      $0 $11,650 
23 30 522      $0 $11,650 
24, thin 30 552 475 14% 77  $2976 $2976 $14,626 
25 30 505    $0  $0 $14,626 
Total  804 505   299 $2,000 $10,626 $14,626 $14,626 
Grant $ 
and CO2 
pay-
ments  
       $4,000  
Avg 
annual 
income 
       $585.04  
Total 
income 
       $34,065  
+Theor-
etical avg 
income 
       $1363  
 100% 63%   37%    % thin = 14 
+Theoretical income is higher than average annual income because it includes the final asset of thinning (see Table 
A-3 below).   
Table A.  Reforest The Tropics-Superior Nut Company and Bresnan Donor Forest in Costa Rica as a Base 
Case.  Latest theoretical version of RTT’s EPICC Model.  Data subject to change according to the actual results of 
the research plots.  The first carbon payment at $5/MT is based on a starting aggregate annual increment of 99 MT 
CO2e (years 1-4 combined).  Data courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, Director, Reforest The Tropics, Inc.  Author, H. 
Barres.  Verified 13 March 2014.  info@reforestthetropics.org   
# Thinning Estimated m3 of 
timber for 
thinnings 
Estimated avg 
wood $ price on 
the stump* 
Estimated 
commercial 
utilization** 
Total Value Cost of 
Thinning 
1 36 55 40 $798 $427 
2 53 55 60 $1745 $629 
3 62 55 70 $2398 $735 
4 70 55 70 $2709 $830 
5 77 55 70 $2976 $913 
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Total value of 
thinnings 
    
$10,626 
 
Asset value 
year 25 
505 55 70% $19,439
  
 
TOTAL (Thins 
+ Final Asset) 
*2013 National 
Forest Office 
Stumpage Price.   
**Estimated 
percent of the 
stem that is 
commercial for 
sale. 
 $30,065  
Table A-1.  RTT EPICC Model Farmer Estimated Thinning Revenue and Cost Estimates—SUBJECT TO 
CONFIRMATION.  To calculate the value of the first thinning, for example, 36 m3 * $55/m3 *.40 commercial 
utilization = $792.  This table also applies to all variations of RTT’s base case.  Data courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, 
Director, Reforest The Tropics, Inc.  Author H. Barres.  Verified 13 March 2014.  info@reforetthetropics.org  
 
 
 
 
 
Total Estimated Farmer 
Income 
 
Initial Grant $2,000 
Carbon Payments 
(Payment Ceiling) 
$2,000 
Thins + Final Asset* $30,065 
TOTAL $34,065 
Avg income/ha/yr (25 yrs) $1,363 
+CO2 Payments $5/MT 
  
+MT captured in last year. 
Price is fixed for contract 
period. 
*Final asset is the estimated end value 
of thinnings (505 MT CO2e 25 year-end 
accumulated carbon in forest * $55/m3 
*.70 commercial utilization =$19,439.)  
 
 
Table A-2. Total Estimated Farmer Income over 25-Year RTT EPICC Contract.  Data courtesy of Dr. Herster 
Barres, Director, Reforest The Tropics, Inc. Author, H. Barres.  Verified 13 March 2014.  
info@reforestthetropics.org 
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Discount Rate r =.03 (3%) r =.06 (6%) r =.09 (9%)  
Present Value of 
Benefits (grant, carbon 
payments, thinnings, 
and final asset) 
$19,115 $11,555 $7562 
Present Value of Costs 
(five thinnings) 
$2145 $1354 $887 
Net Present Value 
(NPV) for Entire 
Contract 
$16,970 $10,201 $6675 
Appropriateness of 
Discount Rate in Terms 
of NPV 
1 2 3 
Table A-3. Comparison of NPVs Using Three Discount Rates for Base Case RTT EPICC Model at $5/MT.  
All values are rounded to nearest whole dollar.  Rank is based on the descending value of NPV.  Discount rates of 3, 
6 and 9 percent are used because they reflect common interest rates employed in past climate policies, according to 
Traegar (2009).   
SCENARIO B (RTT EPICC Uncapped Carbon Payments at Fixed Unit Price of $5/MT)   
End of Yr Growth 
rate/yr 
Yr end  
carbon in 
forest  
Yr end 
volume 
% thin Volume  
thinnings 
Carbon 
payments 
Value of 
thinnings 
Model Accumulated 
income 
1 5 5      $1,000 $1000 
2 19 24      $500 $1500 
3 35 59      $500 $2000 
4 40 99    $495  $495 $2495 
5 40 139    $200  $200 $2695 
6 40 179    $200  $200 $2895 
7 40 219    $200  $200 $3095 
8, thin 40 259 223 14% 36 $200 $798 $998 $4093 
9 35 258    $175  $175 $4268 
10 40 298    $200  $200 $4468 
11 40 338    $200  $200 $4668 
12, thin 40 378 325 14% 53 $200 $1745 $1945 $6613 
13 30 355    $150  $150 $6763 
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14 30 385    $150  $150 $6913 
15 30 415    $150  $150 $7063 
16, thin 30 445 383 14% 62 $150 $2398 $2548 $9611 
17 30 413    $150  $150 $9761 
18 30 443    $150  $150 $9911 
19 30 473    $150  $150 $10061 
20, thin 30 503 432 14% 70 $150 $2709 $2859 $12920 
21 30 462    $150  $150 $13070 
22 30 492    $150  $150 $13220 
23 30 522    $150  $150 $13370 
24, thin 30 552 475 14% 77 $150 $2976 $3126 $16496 
25 30 505    $150  $150 $16646 
Total  804 505   299 $4020 $10,626 $16,646  
Farmer 
grant $ and 
carbon 
payments  
       $6020  
Avg. annual 
income 
       $666  
Total 
income 
       $36,085  
Theoretical 
avg income 
       $1443  
 100% 63%   37%    % thin = 14 
Table B.  Reforest The Tropics-Superior Nut Company and Bresnan Donor Forest in Costa Rica Using an 
Unlimited Cap at Fixed Unit Price of $5/MT for Carbon Payments.  Note: Revenues from thinning estimates are 
the same as the baseline case (see Table A-1 above).  Bold and italicized values indicate carbon payments that have 
been added on top of the base case.  Original data courtesy of Dr. Herster Barres, Director, Reforest The Tropics, 
Inc. info@reforesthetropics.org    
Total Adjusted Estimated Farmer Income  
Initial Grant $2000 
Carbon Payments $4020 
Thins and Final Asset $30,065 
TOTAL $36,085 
Avg. Income/ha/yr (25 yrs) $1443 
+CO2 Payments  $5/MT 
  
+MT captured in last year. Price is fixed for contract period.  
  
Table B-1. Adjusted Total Estimated Farmer Income with No Carbon Payment Cap.    
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Discount Rate r =.03 (3%)  r =.06 (6%)  r =.09 (9%) 
Present Value of 
Benefits (grant, carbon 
payments, thinnings and 
final asset) 
$20,283 $12,250 $7986 
Present Value of Costs 
(five thinnings)  
$2145 $1354 $887 
Net Present Value 
(NPV) for Entire 
Contract 
$18,138 $10,896 $7099 
Appropriateness of 
Discount Rate in Terms 
of NPV 
1 2 3 
Table B-2. Comparison of NPVs Using Three Discount Rates for RTT EPICC Model UNCAPPED at $5/MT.  
All values are rounded to nearest whole dollar.  Rank is based on the descending value of NPV.  
SCENARIO C (RTT Capped and Uncapped Different Fixed Unit Prices of Carbon) 
Year End Annual 
Increment 
(MT) CO2e 
$3/MT $5/MT (base 
case) 
$7/MT $9/MT 
1 5 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 
2 19 $500 $500 $500 $500 
3 35 $500 $500 $500 $500 
4 40 $297 $495 $693 $891 
5 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
6 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
7 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
8 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
9 35 $105 $175 $245 $315 
10 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
11 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
12 40 $120 $200 $280 $360 
13 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
14 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
15 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
16 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
17 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
18 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
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19 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
20 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
21 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
22 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
23 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
24 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
25 30 $90 $150 $210 $270 
Grant $ and 
Carbon 
Payments 
 $4412 $6020 $7628 $9236 
Avg. income   $602 $666 $730 $794 
Total income  $34,477 $36,085 $37,693 $39,301 
Theoretical 
avg. income 
 $1379 $1443 $1508 $1572 
Table C.  Commodification of Carbon Dioxide: Merging Biophysical Data and Prices as an Inter-temporal 
Analysis.  Annual streams of revenues associated with carbon storage and sequestration were calculated utilizing 
different carbon prices and biophysical quantities as components.  Bold and italicized values indicate the last 
payment for each price of carbon if there were a payment cap of $2000.   
 
Figure C-1.  A Visual Representation of the Future Benefits from Carbon Payments.  X-axis indicates years 
and Y-axis indicates dollars.    
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Figure C-2 and C-3. Comparisons of Relative Farmer Income between Capped and Uncapped RTT EPICC 
Model at $5/MT.   
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SCENARIO D (Opportunity Costs of Cattle Ranching in Terms of Forgone Revenue and 
Profit) 
 
Figure D. Opportunity Costs of Cattle Ranching (Forgone Revenue) Versus RTT’s Base Case at $5/MT.  X-
axis indicates years and Y-axis indicates average annual dollar amounts.  Revenues for RTT and cattle ranching are 
averaged annual incomes over 25 years.  For RTT to outcompete the opportunity costs of cattle ranching, average 
farmer income must be higher than $500/ha/year, the optimal revenue scenario for a cattle rancher.  A price of 
$5/MT is the ‘breakeven’ carbon price at which the highest known opportunity costs of cattle ranching is roughly 
equal to RTT’s average farmer income over 25 years.   
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Figure D-1.  RTT and Cattle Ranching (Profitability) Opportunity Costs Over 25 Years.  X-axis indicates 
years and Y-axis indicates overall 25-year profitability.  Profitability for RTT was calculated by subtracting thinning 
costs from thinning income for years 8, 12, 16, 20 and 24.  Cattle ranching profitability was calculated by 
subtracting a cost of $250/year from the three estimated annual averaged opportunity costs (forgone revenue).  A 
price of $5/MT is RTT’s breakeven carbon price to compete with the highest opportunity cost of cattle ranching 
(forgone revenue).     
 
Figure D-3.  NPVs of RTT Base Case Profitability and Three Annualized Averaged Opportunity Costs of 
Cattle Ranching Using Three Discount Rates.  Numbers in red indicate negative NPVs.     
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SCENARIO E (Costa Rica’s PES Program) 
 
Figure E. Ways to Contextualize CO2 Prices.  Carbon sold into compliance carbon markets, such as the California 
Carbon Cap and Trade Program, is expressed as a $/MT.  Carbon sold into a voluntary market via a PES program is 
expressed in hectare form as a $/hectare.  Carbon units expressed in MT/ha will be converted to a $/MT metric.           
Year Non-native species 
$/ha 
Native species $/ha RTT capped 
$5/MT  
RTT capped 
$3/MT  
1 $980 $1470 $1000 
 
$1,000 
2 $980 $1470 $500 $500 
3 $980 $1470 $500 $500 
4 $980 $1470 $495 
 
$297 
5 $980 $1470 $200 $120 
6 -- -- $200 $120 
7 -- -- $200 $120 
8, thin -- -- $998 $918 
9 -- -- $175 $105 
10 -- -- $200 $120 
11 -- -- $200 $120 
12, thin -- -- $1875 $1865 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Over Time 
(longitudinal 
data)
MT/Hectare 
(metric)
Costa Rica 
PES Program 
($/ha)
($/ha) * 
(ha/MT) = 
$/MT
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13 -- -- -- $90 
14 -- -- -- $90 
15 -- -- -- $90 
16, thin $980 $1470 $2398 $2488 
17 $980 $1470 -- $90 
18 $980 $1470 -- $90 
19 $980 $1470 -- $90 
20, thin $980 $1470 $2709 $2799 
21 -- -- -- $38 
22 -- -- -- -- 
23 -- -- -- -- 
24, thin -- -- $2976 $2976 
25 -- -- $19,439 $19,439 
Total income for (2) 
1-ha government 
contracts, (1) RTT 
contract  
$9800 $14,700 $34,065 $34,065 
Present Value, r 
=.03 (3%) 
 
$7369 $11,053 $19,115 $18,960 
Present Value, r 
=.06 (6%) 
$5851 $8776 $11,555 $11,335 
Present Value, r 
=0.9 (9%)  
$4858 $7288 $7562 $7320 
Present Value, r = 
5% for 10 years, 4% 
for 10 years and 3% 
for 5 years 
(descending 
discount rates) 
$6665 $9998 $18,170 $18,293 
Table E.  A Cash Flow and Discounted Cash Flow Comparison of RTT Capped Model for $5/MT (base case) 
and $3/MT (calculated price for PES sequestration) to Costa Rica PES Program for Non-Native and Native 
Species Extended to 25 Years.  Since Costa Rica’s PES program costs are not considered, only benefits are 
projected.  Dashes represent years without landowner income.  Prices of $3/MT and $5/MT are used because $5/MT 
is RTT’s current base case price and $3/MT is the Costa Rica PES program $/MT.  Source for descending discount 
rates: Weitzman, 2001.      
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SCENARIO F (RTT EPICC Different Variable Unit Prices of Carbon) 
End of yr Growth 
rate/yr 
Yr end 
accumulated   
carbon in 
forest 
MT/CO2e 
before 
thinnings  
Yr end 
volume 
after 
thinning 
1 m3= 1 
MT 
CO2e 
% thin Volume 
of 
thinning 
(m3) 
Carbon 
payments 
@ $5/MT 
up to 
$2,000 
starting 
at year 4 
Value of 
thinning 
(see 
Table 1) 
Model 
initial 
$2,000 
grant, 
carbon 
payments 
and 
thinnings 
Accumulated 
income 
          
1 5 5      $1000 $1000           
2 19 24      $500 $1500           
3 35 59      $500 $2000           
4 40 99    $495  $495 $2495           
5 40 139    $200  $200 $2695           
6 40 179    $200  $200 $2895           
7 40 219    $200  $200 $3095           
8, thin 40 259 223 14% 36 $200 $798 $998 $4093           
9 35 258    $175  $175 $4268           
10 40 298    $200  $200 $4468           
11 40 338    $200  $200 $4668           
12, thin 40 378 325 14% 53 $200  $1745 $1945 $6613           
13 30 355    $210  $210 $6823           
14 30 385    $210  $210 $7033           
15 30 415    $210  $210 $7243           
16, thin 30 445 383 14% 62 $210 $2398 $2608 $9851           
17 30 413    $210  $210 $10,061           
18 30 443    $210  $210 $10,271           
19 30 473    $210  $210 $10,481           
20, thin 30 503 432 14% 70 $210 $2709 $2919 $13,400           
21 30 462    $270  $270 $13,670           
22 30 492    $270  $270 $13,940           
23 30 522    $270  $270 $14,210           
24, thin 30 552 475 14% 77 $270 $2976 $3246 $17,456           
25 30 505    $270  $270 $17,726           
Total  804 505   299 $5100 $10,626 $17,726            
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Grant $ 
and CO2 
payments  
       $7100            
Avg annual 
income 
       $709            
Total 
income 
       $37,165            
Theor-
etical avg 
income 
       $1,487            
 100% 63%   37%    % thin = 14           
NPV, r = 
.03 (3%) 
       $18,738            
NPV, r = 
.06 (6%) 
       $11,239            
NPV, r = 
.09 (9%) 
       $7300            
Table F.  Variable Prices of Carbon for RTT EPICC Model.  A price of $5/MT is for years 4-12, $7/MT for 
years 13-20 and $9/MT for years 21-25.    
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Figure G.  Comparisons of NPVs for Variations on RTT Base Case.  N
 
Figure G-1.  Comparison of Present Values across RTT Contract Variations, Opportunity Costs of Cattle 
Ranching and Costa Rica’s PES Program.    
 
Firm Carbon Price+  
Exxon Mobil $60/ton  
Obama Administration   $37/ton++  
Disney $11-14/ton  
California Cap and Trade  $11.50/ton  
Google $11/ton  
EU $6.70/ton  
Microsoft $6-7/ton  
RTT  $15/MT+ 
 
 
+
The variations on carbon price are ascribed to a ton of carbon for each firm’s planning purposes.  RTT’s carbon 
price represents the cost to offset a MT of carbon through the EPICC model.  ++Obama Administration’s entry is 
most likely closer to the ‘social cost of carbon.’ 
Table H.  Internal Costs of Carbon and California Cap and Trade Program.  If RTT farmers sold offsets in 
California’s Cap and Trade scheme, they would earn $11.50/ton CO2e.  A MT is roughly 10 percent more than a ton 
of CO2e (MT= 1.1023 tons).  Therefore, a farmer could sell 505 MT (556.66 tons) * $11.50/ton for a total of $6,402.  
Source: European Union Emissions Trading System 2013.    
 
 
$0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000 $60,000 $70,000
r = .03 (3%)
r = .06 (6%)
r = .09 (9%)
Comparison of Present Values
Scenario A Scenario B Opp Costs Costa Rica Scenario F
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CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
This study does not take into account multiple categories of realistic costs, including, but 
not limited to: project transaction costs, monitoring costs, third-party verification costs and Costa 
Rica PES costs.  Actual RTT thinning costs were not obtained on a landowner case-by-case 
basis, which is likely the most accurate estimate of thinning costs, according to RTT.  Although 
these costs are not included in this study for pragmatic reasons, they exhibit important tradeoffs 
with landowner benefits that should be considered in future studies.  Additionally, the costs of 
the PES reforestation program in Costa Rica are not within the research bounds of this study.  
More in depth-studies should incorporate these costs to the best of their ability in order to 
provide more accurate discounted cost cash flows and NPVs.  Theoretically, NPVs should be 
lower in this study because these costs were not taken into account.  That said, this study does 
not estimate benefit-cost ratios for NPVs because benefits exceed costs by multiple factors.     
     Neither current nor potentially contracted farmers for RTT’s model were consulted or 
interviewed, which could have provided a human behavioral component to the study.  Farmer 
interviews are critical to understanding their wants and needs as working landowners in 
developing contexts and understanding their ways of valuing ecosystem services and ancillary 
environmental and social benefits.  Future studies should capitalize on this opportunity for these 
reasons.   
RTT’s values are theoretical at this point in time.  As with any theoretical data, RTT 
might find a way to disclose more exact and accurate information in the future.  While 
biophysical carbon data points could be generous overestimates, at least they demonstrate what 
an optimal situation would resemble for both RTT and the farmer, meanwhile the science and 
technology of forest management progresses.      
CONCLUSIONS 
Carbon sequestration and commodification in economic farm forests in Costa Rica must 
create value for landowners as a result of a financially compelling value proposition.  Ultimately, 
a landowner will consider the best—or most profitable—use of her land from a private decision-
making perspective.  Using similar comparisons, the landowner can weigh profits from forestry 
against profits from cattle ranching or Costa Rica’s PES program.  The landowner’s financial 
perspective of forestry, cattle ranching, and PES projects is a useful analytical framework for 
thinking about the benefits and costs associated with each scenario.  Furthermore, the nexus 
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between degrading land use activities such as cattle ranching, greenhouse gas emissions, and 
climate change is very strong.  On the other hand, volatility in the carbon markets results in 
buyer uncertainty, which affects market prices of carbon.  The value of offsets aside, carbon 
sequestration and commodification enables landowners to reap economic benefits from 
managing forests as a carbon dioxide sink.  From a biophysical standpoint, it takes carbon 
dioxide out of the atmosphere, which is important for lowering atmospheric ppm.   
In the future, stored carbon in forest biomass may take on an economic value that is 
greater than the same trees sold as logs.  Ultimately, the commodification of carbon has the 
potential to drive a wide wedge between the value of stored carbon and the value of alternative 
land uses.  Above all, it is important that carbon sequestration and commodification make the 
financial case for a landowner to forgo degrading land uses.  At the least, reforestation must fully 
compensate for the highest competing opportunity cost.  As soon as carbon commodification and 
sequestration outcompetes the highest competing opportunity cost, the notion of opportunity 
costs represents an economic loss to the landowner.  Consequently, the landowner will preclude 
land degrading activities by virtue of pursuing economic farm forestry.  Nonetheless, a 
confluence of these factors could enable a transition from land degrading activities to 
reforestation as a viable enterprise, which could be a pivotal point in climate policy decision 
making across the globe.          
    Each case scenario, A-H, represents a discernible core product of the financial analysis 
by packaging these eight scenarios and changing different parameters.  Although it is difficult to 
understand where RTT fits in the larger picture of carbon markets or Costa Rica’s 2021 Carbon 
Neutrality goal, uncapped versus capped carbon payment parameters and different prices of 
carbon are important considerations for the EPICC model.  Questions about a carbon cap and the 
timing and frequency of economic returns in RTT’s base case are crucial considerations for the 
landowner.  The discount rate at which the private landowner will tradeoff present earnings 
versus future earnings or, alternatively, the rate at which the landowner could borrow money at a 
bank is an appropriate way to choose a discount rate.  The latter is perhaps the most appropriate 
perspective on discount rates for this study.     
In Scenario B, the farmer could earn an extra $2020 from carbon payments alone with no 
payment cap at $5/MT.  This value is more than double what he would receive from carbon 
payments in RTT’s base case.  In this scenario, the farmer has no limbo year whereby he earns 
52 
 
$0 in income.  Every year of the 25-year contract the farmer is earning income, the least of which 
is $150/year between years of income from thinnings.   When comparing the NPVs between 
RTT’s base case and Scenario B, the largest difference between NPVs, $1168, results from using 
a discount rate of 3 percent.  If RTT were to compare the NPVs of Scenarios A and B, it must 
consider, once again, how a private landowner will choose to either tradeoff present earnings for 
future earnings or how the private landowner is able to borrow funds at a given rate.  
For Scenario C, different fixed prices of carbon are dollar coefficients that affect cash 
flow.  In the case of $3/MT, $2,000 is used more slowly.  Conversely, a price of $9/MT uses the 
$2,000 cap quickly.  Therefore, the price of carbon would still have an impact on cash flow if 
there was a $2000 price cap on carbon payments.  However, because the cap limits farmer cash 
flow from carbon payments, its impact is also limited.  The role of a carbon price when there is a 
cap on carbon payments is a matter of how quickly the farmer receives $2000.  A farmer who 
earns $2000 in the first half of the contract might consider opportunity costs due to lack of 
financial incentive from carbon payments during the second half.  Notably, a price of $9/MT for 
the $2000 cap is exhausted in year 7, whereas a price of $7/MT is exhausted in year 8.  With 
only a one year difference between the exhaustion of dollar coefficients $7/MT and $9/MT, it 
probably will not make a difference to the farmer which price RTT ascribes to carbon.  On the 
other hand, $3/MT and $5/MT are exhausted in year 11 and 20, respectively.  The difference in 
years between these two coefficients is 9.  Therefore, a price of $3/MT versus a price of $5/MT 
could potentially make a difference to a landowner in terms of years without economic return.  
Alternatively, the landowner could think of these dollar coefficients as raising his average annual 
income $64 per $2 increase in MT price in an uncapped situation.     
Cattle ranching is one of RTT’s biggest competitors.  It is also a barrier to entry with 
respect to reforestation projects.  In Scenario D, by estimating the opportunity costs of both 
forgone revenue and forgone profit and NPVs associated with cattle ranching in a tabular form, 
RTT can visually understand under what financial conditions cattle ranching poses a competitive 
threat to reforestation projects.  In regard to the forgone revenue comparison between estimated 
averaged annual opportunity costs of cattle ranching and RTT’s annual farmer income using its 
base case, RTT average farmer income falls below the $450/year opportunity cost threshold three 
times and falls below the $500/year opportunity costs 9 times.  Undoubtedly, either increased 
dollar coefficients for carbon payments, no cap on carbon payments or a combination thereof 
would provide a financial cushion between RTT farmer average income and the highest 
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thresholds of cattle ranching opportunity costs.  Likewise, when visually viewing the profitability 
and NPVs associated with RTT’s base case, there is no considerable comparison between cattle 
ranching and its base case.  The area in which RTT could improve is raising average annual 
farmer income, as that is a more common metric comparison between the base case and 
opportunity costs of cattle ranching for forgone revenues.  As seen in Scenario C, raising the 
dollar coefficient of carbon $2/MT increases farmer average income by $64 with no carbon 
payment cap.   
Cost Rica’s reforestation PES Program is a recent competitor to RTT’s base case, 
especially with the government’s new Carbon Neutrality goal.  In this scenario, discount rates 
affect the difference between present values of RTT and the PES Program in important ways.  
First, the descending discount rates approach results in the second highest present value next to 3 
percent for all four considerations—two PES and two RTT.  On average, they are a difference of 
$873 from the 3 percent approach, with the capped $3/MT consideration as the smallest 
difference.  Markedly, a 3 percent discount rate is suitable when comparing a $1470/ha PES 
payment and RTT base case at $5/MT.  With a 9 percent discount rate, the difference in present 
value between the two consideration is the smallest, or $274, which makes PES more 
competitive with RTT’s base case.  Conversely, a 3 percent discount rate results in the highest 
difference between present values, or $8062.  A descending discount approach is only $110 off, 
with a difference of $8172, implying it is also a suitable discounting approach.  Lastly, a 3 
percent discount rate and descending discount rates drive a larger wedge between the present 
values of the $1470/ha PES and RTT base case, undermining the competition.   
Ultimately, the highest NPV of any RTT base case variation is Scenario F, different 
variable prices of carbon using a 3 percent discount rate.  However, this NPV is only $500 more 
than Scenario B, RTT Uncapped at $5/MT.  A comparison of NPVs between Scenarios B and F 
using a 9 percent discount rate yields a $201 difference, less than half the difference using 3 
percent.  To compare these, a 3 percent discount rate widens the gap in NPV difference.  In 
Scenario G, it is visually evident that a 9 percent discount rate levels the differences between 
NPVs of RTT’s base case variations, namely Scenarios A, B, and F.  Furthermore, present values 
of Costa Rica’s PES program are higher than those of cattle ranching.                           
If RTT were to enroll one if its hectares in California’s Cap and Trade Program, the 
landowner could potentially earn $6402.  To put this in perspective, the earning is roughly equal 
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to the $6020 amount a farmer could receive from the initial grant and carbon payments alone in 
Scenario B, uncapped carbon payments at a fixed price of $5/MT.  Moreover, firms belonging to 
the same industry, such as Google and Microsoft, are valuing a unit of carbon differently.  This 
suggests firms not only have conflicting valuation methods, but they are not equally capturing 
the burden they are putting on society through a cost of carbon.    
Discount rates matter when considering tradeoffs between past and future benefits.  In 
RTT’s case, discount rates are important.  Particularly, the interest rate at which a Costa Rican 
landowner is able to borrow funds is the most appropriate application of discount rates in this 
study.  It is the perspective of a private financial analysis.     
RTT should structure a contract for a potential landowner that is contingent on carbon 
prices and on profitability comparisons to cattle ranching or Costa Rica’s PES program.  
Specifically, RTT’s new EPICC model is a financial platform that shares the value of stored 
carbon in forests with a landowner.  Not only does RTT pose a way for emitters to offset their 
emissions in the U.S., it makes a case for carbon sequestration in tropical farm forests.  RTT’s 
model for sequestration makes reforestation a two-in-one package: theoretical carbon offsets for 
the emitter and long-term carbon sequestration for climate change.  By that knowledge, RTT 
should continue to justify its cause to procure future funding.  When disclosing the opportunity 
costs of cattle ranching to a potential landowner, RTT should focus on farmer theoretical 
average income over 25 years to overcompensate for the highest opportunity costs of cattle 
ranching, or forgone revenue.  This delineation should be a major component of RTT’s contract 
to a landowner.  Most of all, if RTT were to have an adequate amount of funding, it should 
consider Scenario B, uncapped carbon payments at $5/MT.  A cap on carbon payments is a 
financial detriment to the landowner.  With increased donations from U.S. emitters, RTT could 
pay farmers a fixed unit or variable unit price of carbon for every year in the contract starting at 
year 4.  Therefore, limited funds impose a financial constraint on RTT’s current EPICC model.          
While Scenario F might be the best for the landowner in terms of total income, it is worth 
comparing Scenario B theoretical average income against Scenario F theoretical average income.  
Since the difference is only $44, Scenario B is the best value for RTT’s dollar since it would be 
paying the farmer more than $1000 less for carbon payments.  It is a meaningful case assuming 
that adequate funding is able to extend carbon payments to 25 years.  Also, payments awarded 
each year of the contract incentivize good management of the forest and carbon stocks.            
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While some argue the gold standard for national climate change policy is a carbon tax, 
carbon dioxide commodification is an economically viable and tangible carbon mitigation 
strategy.  Due to miscellaneous policy stringencies in developed countries, companies may not 
feel the need to offset their emissions until they are required under regulation.  Meanwhile, as 
they begin to feel public and political pressure to reduce their emissions, more studies should 
examine how firms value carbon.                    
Pending the advent of stronger U.S. national climate change policies, carbon 
sequestration and commodification is a valuable option in the interim.  Because there is 
mounting social pressure for companies and corporations to take action on climate change, RTT 
casts applied research and demonstration projects as a worthy cause to potential donors.  
However, companies that choose to act voluntarily on climate change are the leaders of corporate 
social responsibility.  When a firm is not being regulated, and yet reduces emissions on its own, 
it is a virtuous act.  An oil company’s variable cost of carbon is high relative to others.  Since oil 
companies are likely to become regulated in the near future, their internal prices are higher than a 
company like Microsoft that makes consumer goods.  Therefore, firms ascribe a carbon price in 
anticipation of future compliance and to calculate the value of future projects.  Companies with 
higher prices are closer to the social cost of carbon—the marginal damage from an extra ton of 
carbon—than to market price.  With the current lack of a U.S. national policy for regulating 
carbon dioxide, carbon sequestration and commodification is the sleeping giant of mitigation 
strategies.           
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